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RAPE AS A FORM OF TORTURE:
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE COMMITTEE
AGAINST TORTURE
Felice D. Gaer †
RECOGNIZING A SILENCE
Since the late 1980s, Professor Rhonda Copelon provided in-
tellectual leadership in the evolution of the norm of torture and
the recognition of its negative gendered origins, as well as ways to
address this more positively. Working through and with the Inter-
national Women’s Human Rights Clinic (“IWHR”) at City Univer-
sity of New York (“CUNY”) School of Law, as well as with activists
and advocates worldwide, she saw and explained to others how the
issues of domestic violence and rape had been wrongly isolated
from the human rights normative framework. They were not seen
as violence, she explained, but as personal and private matters,
which were not embraced within the international legal discourse,
as their discriminatory nature was also invisible. She engaged in
effective advocacy that helped develop the legal avenues through
which to address these matters in ways that have profoundly influ-
enced the discourse as well as international legal mechanisms.1
These remarks recap the recognition of rape as a form of tor-
ture by several international human rights mechanisms and discuss
in particular how the Committee Against Torture has continued to
address the issue since the adoption of its General Comment No. 2
in November 2007.
BREAKING THE SILENCE
In 1986, recognition by United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Torture, Peter Kooijmans, that rape in prison should be regarded
as torture,2 opened the door to discussion and codification of
† Felice D. Gaer, M.A., M.Ph., is vice-chair of the U.N. Committee Against Torture
and Director of the American Jewish Committee’s Jacob Blaustein Institute for the
Advancement of Human Rights.
1 See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as
Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291 (1994); Rhonda Copelon, Gender Violence as
Torture: The Contribution of CAT General Comment No. 2, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 229 (2008).
2 See Special Rapporteur on Torture, Report on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1986/15, ¶ 119 (1986) (by Peter Kooijmans) [hereinafter Kooijmans, Report on
Torture].
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norms on a subject that had previously been ignored, despite the
years of U.N. proscription of torture and ill treatment. Indeed,
even at the 1980 Copenhagen World Conference on Women,
where the broad issue of violence against women was at long last
raised, albeit timidly, in the context of the U.N.’s separate pro-
grams dealing with the status of women, the issue of rape and
other violence against women was presented not as a human rights
issue, nor as a matter of discrimination, but rather as an issue of
women’s health.3 Kooijmans offered recognition that rape was one
of a long list of techniques used against detainees constituting
torture.4
While the reference to rape by the Special Rapporteur on Tor-
ture was considered a breakthrough at the international level in
addressing rape, Kooijmans did not address violence against wo-
men more broadly. Rape was simply one of many techniques used
in the jail cell, either for extracting confessions or humiliating pris-
oners.5 Kooijmans nonetheless helped women’s rights activists to
push forward. Having previously achieved adoption of the 1979
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (“CEDAW”), they began to press effectively for rec-
ognition of women’s rights as human rights. That acknowledge-
ment came later in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action of the World Conference on Human Rights6 and the
1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of the Fourth
World Conference on Women.7
A SEA CHANGE
After this recognition of rape as a form of violence, and of
violence against women as a form of discrimination, a key goal,
according to Rhonda Copelon, was finding ways to move away from
treating torture in a gender discriminatory context into a gender
inclusive one. Among the key achievements that followed were the
recognition of rape and sexual violence as torture in international
criminal law regarding war crimes tribunals; the acknowledgment
3 Felice D. Gaer, Women, International Law and International Institutions, 32 WO-
MEN’S STUDIES INT’L FORUM 60, 63 (2009).
4 See Kooijmans, Report on Torture, supra note 2, ¶ 119.
5 See Kooijmans, Report on Torture, supra note 2, ¶ 119.
6 See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14–15, 1993, Vienna Declaration
and Programme for Action, ¶¶ 36–44, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993).
7 See generally Fourth World Conference on Women, Sept. 4–15, 1995, Beijing Dec-
laration and Platform for Action, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and A/CONF.177/
20/Add.1 (1995).
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of rape as abuse in the conclusions of U.N. treaty bodies and inde-
pendent special rapporteurs; and the adoption of General Com-
ment No. 2 of the Committee Against Torture,8 which explicitly
discusses rape and gender-based violence in the context of the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
As discussions began on whether to create an international
criminal tribunal to address the responsibility of individual perpe-
trators in the Yugoslav conflict, the issue of whether rape was a war
crime was raised, debated, and successfully included in the draft
and final statutes of the Yugoslav war crimes tribunal.
Rhonda Copelon and other NGO experts successfully pursued
the issue of gender violence as torture at the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, as well as in the negotiations
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Gender-
based crimes were included in the statutes and some successful
prosecutions followed.  Notably, in Prosecutor v. Kunarac,9 known as
the Foca judgment, the ICTY Appeals Chamber held that the nu-
merous rapes of Bosnian Muslim women in both Bosnian Serb pri-
vate homes and detention centers constituted torture, and the
accused were convicted for rape, enslavement, and inhumane acts.
Thereafter, as the former legal advisor to the ICTY prosecutor, Pa-
tricia Viseur Sellers, has described it, the Kunarac trial chamber
“held that humanitarian law eschewed an element of State or offi-
cial capacity or acquiescence or consent of official capacity.”10
In the Committee Against Torture and the Human Rights
Committee, and in consultations with the special rapporteurs,
Rhonda Copelon and the IWHR Clinic also pressed for recognition
of the gravity of officially inflicted sexualized violence as well as
privately inflicted gender violence where the state does not inter-
vene to exercise due diligence to prevent it. Subjects raised in these
NGO submissions ranged from the sexualized abuses of women de-
tainees at Abu Ghraib prison to coerced interrogation of women
seeking medical services for incomplete and life-threatening abor-
tions in Chile.
8 See Comm. Against Torture, General Comment No. 2, Implementation of Arti-
cle 2 by States Parties, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/GC/2 (Jan. 24, 2008) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 2].
9 See Prosecutor v. Kunarac, No. IT-96-23/1-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/
en/kun-tj010222e.pdf.
10 Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual Torture As A Crime Under International Criminal and
Humanitarian Law, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 339, 348 (2008).
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The results of such information-based advocacy from NGOs
were impressive: the Committee Against Torture identified such
practices to be concerns under the Torture Convention in the pro-
cess of discussing and adopting General Comment No. 2. The
Human Rights Committee also recognized gender-based violence
as torture or ill treatment.
The Committee Against Torture examined the issue further in
its process of adopting General Comment No. 2 on the Prevention
of Torture. Numerous experts, NGOs, and national human rights
institutions offered advice and comments prior to finalization of
General Comment No. 2. A year later, the then-New York City Law
Review devoted a symposium to General Comment No. 2 so that its
path breaking and inclusive character could begin to be under-
stood, particularly with regard to gender-based violence.
In 2008, the Special Rapporteur on Torture published an ex-
tensive report on Gender and Torture that lent further weight to
understanding torture as encompassing many forms of gender vio-
lence, for which both official and non-state actors are responsible.
TORTURE AND ACTIONS OF PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS
As Committee members have reminded States parties with in-
adequate definitions of torture, there is a difference between nam-
ing and prosecuting conduct as “aggravated assault” or “abuse of
power,” and identifying it as torture.  A key outcome of General
Comment No. 2 was thus to include and name rape as a form of
torture.
The reasons for naming and defining the crime of torture ap-
ply generally, and equally strongly, to the phenomenon of rape:
defining the crime will alert everyone to the special gravity of tor-
ture, and the need to strengthen deterrent measures; and will assist
the Committee as well as empower the public to monitor and chal-
lenge state action.11 General Comment No. 2 emphasizes the legal
responsibility of those in the chain of command as well as the di-
rect perpetrators, including by acts of instigation, consent, or
acquiescence.
By focusing on the obligation to prevent torture, the CAT re-
minds each State party to “closely monitor its officials and those
acting on its behalf,” to report to the Committee on any incidents
prohibited by the CAT, and to investigate, punish, and prevent fur-
ther incidents. General Comment No. 2 also reminds everyone of
11 General Comment No. 2, supra note 8, ¶ 11.
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the CAT’s applicability to all persons under the state’s control or
custody.
General Comment No. 2 further emphasizes how broadly the
word “all” extends by referring explicitly to an array of institutions,
locations, and actors. It actually lists a number of venues of custody
or control, including prisons, hospitals, schools, institutions that
care for children, the aged, the mentally ill or disabled, and mili-
tary institutions. States are reminded that they have obligations
with regard to the acts of state agents, private contractors, and
others acting in official capacity or on behalf of the state or under
its direction or control. General Comment No. 2 further points out
“contexts where the failure of the state to intervene encourages
and enhances the danger of privately inflicted harm.”12
The obligation of the State party to prevent torture necessarily
extends to identifying and assigning responsibility for impermissi-
ble acts by non-state or private actors. Such acts are covered if a
state fails to exercise due diligence.
As suggested above, there have been ongoing discussions over
whether acts committed by private individuals ever trigger state re-
sponsibility under the CAT. The jurisprudence of the Committee,
and other international bodies, makes it clear that there is indeed
an array of circumstances in which the acts of private individuals
triggers state responsibility for torture or ill treatment under the
CAT. Measures needed to ensure due diligence have been defined
repeatedly by U.N. experts and authoritative bodies working on is-
sues of violence against women, including rape.
Importantly, General Comment No. 2 expresses concern
about situations “where the state authorities or others . . . know or
have reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture or ill-treat-
ment are being committed by non-state officials or private actors
and they fail to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, pros-
ecute, and punish.” Such inaction even can be understood to con-
stitute a form of encouragement or de facto permission.13
Under the CAT’s article 2, States parties have an obligation to
“take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures
to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” On
the basis of a plain reading, this must surely include measures to
ensure that there is no acquiescence in such acts of torture carried
out by non-state actors for purposes of “discrimination of any
12 Id. ¶ 15.
13 Id. ¶ 18.
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kind,” as set out in the CAT’s article 1, including violence against
women.
The significance of this point becomes even clearer when un-
derstood in the context of article 2(1) of the CAT, which clearly
requires that “[e]ach State Party shall take effective legislative, ad-
ministrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in
any territory under its jurisdiction.” The emphasis of this article is
thus not on an optional obligation or even an “appropriate” form
of action; it requires that the measures taken by States parties to
prevent torture must in fact be effective. This means that results
accomplished will be the standard for judgments on compliance,
not a State party’s aspirations. It further implies that it must in-
clude measures to ensure that there is no acquiescence in such acts
when carried out by non-state actors. In a commentary to the
CEDAW Convention’s article 2, Andrew Byrnes has argued the
CEDAW Convention’s requirement calling on States parties “to
take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women by any person, organization or enterprise” carries obliga-
tions of result as well. Looking at both of these together, taking
“effective measures” under the CAT must be at least as demanding
as an obligation under the CEDAW to take “all appropriate
measures.”14
One of the panelists at this Symposium argued that, however
“torturous” the act of rape might be to the victim, the action has to
be directly committed by or acquiesced to by a public official for it
to be considered torture under the Convention. He stated it was
rare that steps by a government official failing to take due diligence
can be called a violation of human rights. He nonetheless urged
states to take measures not to neglect the serious matters of domes-
tic violence, and, indeed, acknowledged that they should exercise
due diligence in order to protect people. But his argument raises
the question of whether “failure to prevent” constitutes a breach of
the Convention, and what constitutes an appropriate due diligence
standard as applied regarding violence against women. It further
draws our attention to how such a standard can be applied with
regard to the acts by private persons committing the abuse of rape.
There is a considerable body of law, practice, and interna-
tional legal opinion on the elements of due diligence expected in
cases of violence against women, all the more so because such vio-
14 Andrew C. Byrnes & Marsha Freeman, The Impact of the CEDAW Convention: Paths
to Equality, (UNSW Law Research Paper No. 2012-7, 2012), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2011655.
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lence is understood to be a form of discrimination against wo-
men.15 Since the CAT identifies “discrimination of any kind” as one
of the four purposive elements required for an act to constitute
torture, acts of violence against women must be understood in a
context of discrimination, and when they are perpetrated, they
take on a character that rises above any mere individual criminal
action.
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Yakin
Ertürk, summarized international thinking on the issue of due dili-
gence standards thusly:
The due diligence standard has been crucial in developing state
responsibility for violence perpetrated by private actors in the
public and private arenas. It imposes upon the state the respon-
sibility for illegal acts that are not directly committed by the
State or its agents but by private actors on account of State fail-
ure to take sufficient steps to prevent the illegal acts from occur-
ring. Likewise, once an illegal act has occurred, the State’s
inaction and failure to investigate prosecute or punish the act
perpetrated by a private actor amounts to neglect of the State
obligation to be duly diligent. The due diligence standard has
long been part of international law . . . placing upon the state
the duty to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide compensa-
tion for all acts of VAW wherever they may occur.16
Ertürk points out that there are positive expectations of mea-
sures to be taken by each State party including ratifying relevant
treaties, enacting special legislation, and ensuring positive action
by the state:
through policies, programmes, creation of special mechanisms
such as ombudspersons commissions, public education cam-
paigns, sensitization of agencies engage . . . or collection of data
to assess the de facto status of the problem. Protection requires
the State to establish or promote institutional arrangements that
provide services vital to respond to VAW, such as counseling,
shelter, heathcare, crisis support, restraining orders, and finan-
15 See generally Robert Perry Barnidge, The Due Diligence Principle Under International
Law, 8 INT’L CMTY. L REV. 1 (2006), for discussion of the standards required for due
diligence regarding violence against women. See also DUE DILIGENCE AND ITS APPLICA-
TION TO PROTECT WOMEN FROM VIOLENCE (C. Benninger-Budel ed., 2008); Opuz v.
Turkey, App. No. 33401/02, (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009); Maria da Penha Maia Fernandes v.
Brazil, Case 12.051, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 54/01, ¶ 56 (2001); Velas-
quez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4 (July 29, 1988).
16 Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences,
15 Years of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and
Consequences (1994–2009): A Critical Review, ¶ 66, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/6/Add.5
(May 27, 2009) (by Yakin Ertürk).
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cial aid . . . . Punishment is measured in terms of action taken
. . . in relation to investigating and prosecuting cases of violence
or abuse.17
Earlier, Professor Copelon had demonstrated the gender-bi-
ased elements of the CAT’s definition of torture, including how it
draws inappropriate, gendered distinctions between private and
public space. General Recommendation 19 of the CEDAW Com-
mittee defined gender violence as a form of discrimination against
women,18 helping re-conceptualize violence against women from a
gender perspective.19 Copelon wrote that domestic violence had to
be understood “as a system of psychological and physical control”
that could amount to torture. And she commented on the rele-
vance of the CAT Committee’s General Comment: “That this un-
derstanding has gained official recognition in General Comment
No. 2 is thus particularly thrilling as I believe unveiling gender vio-
lence as torture is critical to eliminating discrimination in the
norm of torture . . . emphasizing the urgency of concerted and
effective prevention . . . and empowering the survivors.”20
The CEDAW Committee’s General Recommendation 28 re-
calls that the definition of discrimination in the women’s conven-
tion addresses both purpose and effect of the discriminatory
treatment.21 In fact, General Recommendation 28 points out that
CEDAW’s prohibition on discrimination “would mean that identi-
cal or neutral treatment of women and men might constitute dis-
crimination against women if such treatment resulted in or had the
effect of women being denied the exercise of a right because there
17 Id. ¶ 67.
18 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recom-
mendation No. 19, Violence Against Women, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 (1992).
19 Rhonda Copelon, Gender Violence As Torture: The Contribution of CAT General Com-
ment No. 2, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 229, 238-39 (2008).
20 Id. at 233.
21 Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recom-
mendation No. 28, The Core Obligations of States Parties Under Article 2 of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28 (Dec. 16, 2010)[hereinafter General Recommendation No.
28]; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (1984) (explicitly referencing discrimination against
women as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women of human
rights and fundamental freedoms,” thus recognizing discrimination against women
may result even where an act of discrimination was not intended). See also Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (referencing “discrimination of any kind” as a purpo-
sive element of torture, surely included all forms of discrimination, including gender-
based discrimination).
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was no recognition of the pre-existing gender-based disadvantage
and inequality that women face.”22 General Recommendation 28
recalls that:
States parties have an obligation not to cause discrimination
against women through acts or omissions; they are further
obliged to react actively against discrimination against women,
regardless of whether such acts or omissions are perpetrated by
the State or by private actors.  Discrimination can occur through
the failure of States to take necessary legislative measures to en-
sure the full realization of women’s rights, the failure to adopt
national policies aimed at achieving equality between women
and men and the failure to enforce relevant laws.23
Further, paragraph 13 of the General Recommendation states that:
Article 2 is not limited to the prohibition of discrimination
against women caused directly or indirectly by States parties. Ar-
ticle 2 also imposes a due diligence obligation on States parties
to prevent discrimination by private actors. In some cases, a pri-
vate actor’s acts or omission of acts may be attributed to the
State under international law. States parties are thus obliged to
ensure that private actors do not engage in discrimination
against women as defined in the Convention. The appropriate
measures that States parties are obliged to take include the regu-
lation of the activities of private actors with regard to education,
employment and health policies and practices, working condi-
tions and work standards, and other areas in which private ac-
tors provide services or facilities, such as banking and housing.24
In paragraph 19, the CEDAW Committee’s General Recom-
mendation 28 repeats that “States parties have a due diligence obli-
gation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish such acts of
gender-based violence.”25
In assessing the matter of state responsibility concerning acts
of rape that fall under the broader category of torture and violence
against women, it seems clear that private acts of rape can indeed
constitute torture under the CAT, if due diligence is not applied,
and such diligence requires, inter alia, examining the nature of a
State party’s actions to prevent, prosecute, investigate, punish, and
provide reparation. General Comment No. 2 states this directly. Us-
ing such a due diligence standard, it is simply inadequate to argue
that the State party’s authority must exhibit direct acquiescence to
22 General Recommendation No. 28, supra note 21, ¶ 5.
23 Id. ¶ 10.
24 Id. ¶ 13.
25 Id. ¶ 19.
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each single act of abuse in order to establish state responsibility. It
is inadequate to claim that individual acts of rape and violence
against women do not amount to torture under the CAT, as if such
acts occur in a vacuum outside the context of state policies that
perpetuate discrimination and violence against women.26
It is worth noting that then-Special Rapporteur on Violence
against Women, Yakin Ertürk, referencing the due diligence re-
quirements set forth in the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, pointed out that “the application of the
due diligence standard, to date, has tended to be state-centric and
limited to responding to violence when it occurs, largely neglecting
the obligation to prevent and compensate and the responsibility of
non-State actors.”27 She argued that due diligence must be ex-
plored at “different levels of intervention: individual women, the
community, the State and the transnational level,” and she has of-
fered guidelines for each level of intervention.
Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, also reached
a similar conclusion in his 2010 report when, in the context of a
discussion of privately inflicted harm, he addressed domestic vio-
lence and the fact that most states do not take “enough action . . .
to protect women and children against ill-treatment by their hus-
bands, partners or parents.” He concluded that “[b]y not acting
with due diligence to protect victims of domestic violence . . . and
similar practices, States may commit torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment by acquiescence.”28
The CAT’s General Comment No. 2 and the practice of the
Committee clearly agree with Nowak’s analysis.
RAPE AND TORTURE SINCE GENERAL COMMENT NO. 2 AT THE
COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE
Almost five years have passed since the adoption of General
Comment No. 2. In the section below, we examine how the Com-
26 See Andrew Byrnes, Article 2, in THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINA-
TION AGAINST WOMEN: A COMMENTARY 88 (Freeman, Chinkin, and Rudolf, eds., 2012).
27 Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences,
Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the Gender Perspective: Violence Against Wo-
men, the Due Diligence Standard as a Tool for the Elimination of Violence Against Women,
Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/61 (by
Yakin Ertürk).
28 Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, Report on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/39, ¶ 62 (Feb 9, 2010)
(by Manfred Nowak).
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mittee has in fact addressed issues of rape and violence against
women.
To begin with, the Committee has substantially expanded its
sensitivity to and awareness of the issue of violence against women,
and rape in particular. Today, it routinely addresses the subject in
its concluding observations following examinations of individual
country reports. Indeed, the Committee has also embedded the
concept of rape as torture in its ongoing work, procedurally. States
are commonly asked for data on such cases and particularly about
the measures taken with respect to their investigation, prosecution,
and any relevant punishment or redress. During the oral review,
such questions are commonplace, often extending to legislative is-
sues such as criminalization of marital rape, exculpatory punish-
ments when perpetrators marry their victims, amnesty laws, etc.
A review of the Committee’s concluding observations on coun-
try reports reveals that the Committee has referred to the issue of
rape in at least forty-six cases it has reviewed between 2002 and
2011. The number of such cases in which rape is referenced ex-
panded substantially following the beginning of the Committee’s
serious discussion of these issues during the consideration of the
draft of General Comment No. 2 in 2006, and even more so after
its adoption in 2007. Specifically, rape was mentioned in three
Committee conclusions between 2002 and 2005.29 Between 2006
and the end of 2007, when the General Comment No. 2 was
adopted, rape was cited in conclusions concerning twelve states.30
Since then and through the end of 2011, thirty-one countries ex-
amined have had issues related to rape mentioned in Committee
conclusions following the adoption of General Comment No. 2.31
Furthermore, an examination of the concluding observations
and recommendations of the Committee Against Torture reveals
that the issues raised, including simply those concerned with rape,
are themselves quite varied and have changed in scope.
Prior to 2006, the Committee referenced rape very rarely in its
conclusions and observations. In 2002, the only mention of rape in
Committee concluding comments was a reference after Spain’s re-
view to concern over “[c]omplaints concerning the treatment of
29 Spain, Colombia, and Finland.
30 United States, Rep. of Korea, Peru, Togo, Guyana, South Africa, Mexico,
Burundi, Poland, Japan, Benin, and Latvia.
31 Algeria, Macedonia, Zambia, Indonesia, Iceland, China, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Nic-
aragua, Philippines, Chad, El Salvador, Yemen, Moldova, Cameroon, Mongolia, Syria,
Jordan, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Turkey, Bosnia, Madagascar, Finland, Morocco, Sri
Lanka, Mauritius, Ghana, Belarus, Turkmenistan, and Bulgaria.
304 CUNY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:293
immigrants, including sexual abuses and rape” and, in this context,
further concern about the particular importance the Committee
attached to the incomplete definition of torture in Spain’s penal
code, which lacked reference to such acts when “based on discrimi-
nation of any kind.”32 Similarly, in the 2003 review of Colombia,
the Committee expressed concern over “allegations and informa-
tion indicating . . . inadequate protection against rape and other
forms of sexual violence allegedly frequently used as a form of tor-
ture or ill-treatment.” While recommending that Colombia investi-
gate, prosecute, and punish those responsible for rape and sexual
violence, the Committee made a special point of mentioning that
this occurs “in the framework of operations against illegal armed
groups,”33 strongly suggesting that the practice was attributable to
government agents. In 2005, there was a positive reference to Fin-
land’s laws aiding victims of torture and rape, but nothing more.
It was not until 2006 that the Committee addressed reports of
rape more frequently, referencing rape in the conclusions of at
least forty-three country compliance reviews since then. The con-
cerns ranged from rape in detention, armed conflict, or at the
hands of public or law enforcement officials, to the need for pre-
ventive measures to address and correct laws that inadequately pro-
tect against rape. States parties have been advised to amend the
definitions in their laws and to criminalize rape including marital
rape, and to address issues of consent and more.
Reports of rape in war, peacetime, police operations, or ordi-
nary life were cited by the Committee in conclusions on fifteen
countries.34 Some recommendations focused on rape in detention.
At least eleven countries have been criticized for reports of rape by
state agents, including law enforcement and police officers. These
include Colombia, Togo, Mexico, Japan, Indonesia, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Philippines, Ethiopia, Chad, and Turkey.
While many Committee country conclusions also criticize vio-
32 Report of the Comm. Against Torture, 29th Sess., Nov. 11–22, 2002, 30th Sess.,
Apr. 28–May 16, 2003, U.N. Doc A/58/44, ¶ 61; GAOR 58th Sess., Supp. No. 44
(2004).
33 Annual Report of the Comm. Against Torture, 31st Sess., Nov. 10–21, 2003, 32d
Sess., May 3–21, 2004, U.N. Doc A/59/44, ¶ 68(d); GAOR 59th Sess., Supp. No. 44
(2004).
34 Countries include Burundi (systematic use of rape as a weapon of war), Chad
(criticizing government agents, armed forces, and allies of the government for rape
and citing incidents at internally displaced person camps, refugee camps, and impu-
nity), Indonesia (by military personnel), and Mexico (in police operations), as well as
Cambodia, Turkey, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Zambia, Benin, Ethio-
pia, Morocco, and South Africa.
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lence against women in general, which involves non-state actors,
only a few criticize rape per se by non-state actors. The latter cases
appear to involve armed groups: Algeria, where hundreds were
raped by members of armed groups, and no investigations or pros-
ecutions followed; Chad, where rapes were reportedly perpetrated
by militias, armed groups, and forces of others; and Syria, where
reports, based on the reports of other international bodies, also
identified sexual violence by public officials.
Other recommendations also address rape, sometimes in the
context of domestic violence and sometimes more broadly. Since
2006, the Committee has asked eleven states to criminalize marital
rape, which is perpetrated by non-state actors.35 In others, such as
Jordan and Syria, the Committee has demanded an end to exculpa-
tory provisions in law that permit rape charges against the perpe-
trator to be dropped if he marries his victim. Four countries were
criticized for their abortion laws, three of which forbid abortion in
all circumstances, specifically including rape. Five countries were
asked for data on rape incidents in their states; two were advised to
train their officials to address such cases.
As can be seen, there are already a sizable number of states
being scrutinized regarding their compliance with the CAT’s provi-
sions calling for humane treatment and with regard to the issue of
rape.
INDIVIDUAL COMMUNICATIONS
The Committee Against Torture has examined some commu-
nications in which the matter of rape featured prominently. One of
these was V.L. vs. Switzerland in 2005,36 involving a Belarusian wo-
man and incidents she experienced with local police in Belarus.37
The Committee has examined individual cases, in some of
which there were violations of article 3, which prohibits returning a
person to a country if he or she faces a risk of torture involving
rape. The key to the examination of these cases insofar as they ad-
dress rape and gender violence seems to reflect the significant rea-
35 Countries encouraged to criminalize marital rape have included Rep. of Korea,
Benin, Latvia, Zambia, Cameroon, Syria, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Mongolia, China, and
Bulgaria.
36 Comm. Against Torture, V. L. v. Switzerland, Communication 262/2005, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/37/D/262/2005 (Nov. 20, 2006).
37 See generally Katharine Fortin, Comment, Rape as Torture: An Evaluation of the
Committee Against Torture’s Attitude to Sexual Violence, 4 UTRECHT L. REV. 145 (2008)
(assessing this decision and how it demonstrates changes in the Committee’s ap-
proach to the subject).
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soning and decision in V.L. v. Switzerland, which directly addressed
the public-private distinction and discussed the gendered nature of
the Convention. Further examined in V.L. v. Switzerland was the
role of non-state actors in threatening torture, the location of tor-
ture, and the prohibited purpose of the act(s) of torture.
In the following two cases, where violations of article 3 were
found, the issue arose of return to a country where rape was preva-
lent and conducted by non-state actors as well as state actors. In
these cases, the Committee found a risk of return to torture.
In Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden,38 the complainant claimed that she
would be imprisoned and tortured if returned to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) in violation of article 3 of the Con-
vention, since she had been arrested and, while in detention, had
been subjected to torture, beatings, and multiple rapes, due to her
religious and political activities. The Committee noted the claims
and evidence submitted by the complainant, the arguments of the
State party, as well as the recent reports by seven U.N. experts and
by the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights on the human
rights situation in the country. In the light of the information
before it, the Committee Against Torture considered that it was
impossible to identify particular areas of the country that could be
considered safe for the complainant. After having taken into ac-
count all the factors relevant for its assessment under article 3 of
the Convention, and considering that the complainant’s account
of events was consistent with the Committee’s knowledge about the
present human rights situation in the DRC, the Committee con-
cluded that substantial grounds existed for believing that the com-
plainant was at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to the
DRC. As noted, the Committee found a violation of article 3 of the
CAT.
In Njamba and Balikosa v. Sweden,39 the two complainants,
mother and daughter, fled to Sweden from the DRC after discover-
ing that all the rest of the family was murdered. The applicants
claim, inter alia, that if they were returned to the DRC they would
be subject to rape and sexual exploitation by DRC security forces.
Sweden did not agree that the applicants’ fear of torture was con-
vincing. However, the Committee decided against Sweden’s posi-
tion, citing human rights reports that sexual violence was very
38 Comm. Against Torture, Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden, Communication 379/2009, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/46/D/379/2009 (Jun. 3, 2011).
39 Comm. Against Torture, Njamba and Balikosa v. Sweden, Communication 322/
2007, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/44/D/322/2007 (May 14, 2010).
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common in all the provinces in the DRC, and that there are sub-
stantial grounds to fear that these applicants will be subject to such
violence, recognizing rape as a form of violence against women
where the state had failed to exercise due diligence to prevent its
perpetration by non-state actors.
LESSONS LEARNED AND THE FUTURE
1. Encouraging more awareness of CAT’s General Comment No. 2
Almost four years after the publication of General Comment
No. 2, the significance of the comment and its potential for inter-
national and national advocacy and scholarship remains underde-
veloped. The U.N. does not undertake to disseminate such
documents (other than post them on the website and refer to them
in documents) in a way that brings them home to those who need
them badly and would be most likely to use them.
NGOs and complainants should engage more with the Com-
mittee on this, using the various procedures available under the
CAT.
2. Continuing monitoring and interventions regarding gender and
torture
More work clearly needs to be pursued to assist monitoring
and intervention regarding gender-based violence. Despite the
groundbreaking developments in understanding sexual and gen-
der-based violence as torture, there is still much work to be done to
ensure that the torture framework is both used and respected. This
is critically important as it ensures that rape and other gender vio-
lence will remain as one of the gravest human rights violations hav-
ing peremptory or jus cogens status. There is an obvious need to
continue the practice of lodging complaints in such cases or devel-
oping appropriate new approaches as the need arises.
Addressing this issue in the context of torture has yet another
utility, as attested to by rape and domestic violence survivors, be-
cause this approach transfers the burden of responsibility and
shame to the perpetrator and away from the victim. In this way, it
further helps to transform cultural understanding and practical
prevention of such violence. Monitoring and lodging legal com-
plaints through international bodies such as the Committee fur-
ther demands that the state meet its due diligence obligations to
prevent, investigate, prosecute, and redress such forms of torture.
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3. Seeking greater efforts to ensure the state meets due diligence
obligations to prevent, investigate, punish, and redress acts of
rape by private actors in violation of the CAT
This final point, of course, is discussed earlier in this Article.
But it merits repetition one last time, if only because Rhonda
Copelon would have wanted us to add it to reemphasize the impor-
tance of concentrating legal skills and submissions on this subject.
